Former Governor of the old Gongola State and former National Chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, will be buried in Yola, Adamawa State, on Sunday, September 13, 2026.

Tukur, a prominent elder statesman and businessman, died in Abuja on Saturday, according to a statement issued by his family.

His son, Awwal Tukur, the Secretary to the Adamawa State Government, announced the burial arrangements in a statement released in Yola on Saturday.

According to the statement, the remains of the deceased will be brought to Yola on Saturday ahead of the funeral.

The funeral prayers are scheduled to take place at the Lamido’s Palace in Yola at 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, after which the late politician will be laid to rest.

Tukur died just three days before his 91st birthday.

He was a prominent figure in Nigeria’s political and economic history, having served in several key public positions during a career spanning more than six decades.

Among other positions, he served as Chief Executive of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), Governor of the former Gongola State and Minister of Industries. He also served as National Chairman of the PDP between 2012 and 2014.

Beyond Nigeria, Tukur played a role in promoting African economic development through organisations including the Africa Business Roundtable and the NEPAD Business Group.

The late elder statesman is survived by two wives and 18 children, including Awwal Tukur, the Secretary to the Adamawa State Government.

Northern Governors Mourn

The Northern Nigeria Governors’ Forum (NNGF) has expressed grief over the death of Tukur, describing his passing as a significant loss to the North and Nigeria as a whole.

In a condolence message issued on behalf of the forum, its Chairman and Governor of Gombe State, Muhammadu Inuwa Yahaya, described Tukur as an experienced public servant, political leader and advocate of economic development.

Yahaya said Tukur’s contributions to public administration, politics and business had left a lasting mark on the country.

He highlighted the deceased’s extensive public service record, including his tenure at the Nigerian Ports Authority, his leadership of the old Gongola State and his service as Minister of Industries.

The NNGF chairman also recognised Tukur’s involvement in continental economic initiatives and his leadership of the PDP between 2012 and 2014.

“Alhaji Bamanga Tukur lived a long and impactful life, serving Nigeria in several critical capacities and contributing significantly to the growth of our economy, institutions and political development,” Yahaya said.

He added that Tukur’s experience, wisdom and dedication to public service would be greatly missed.

Yahaya extended his condolences to the Adamawa State Government, the Tukur family, friends and associates of the deceased.

He prayed that Allah would forgive Tukur’s shortcomings, reward his contributions to humanity and grant him Aljannatul Firdaus.

The Dangote Petroleum Refinery and Petrochemicals FZE is set to offer shares to the Nigerian public, giving individuals an opportunity to become shareholders in one of Africa’s largest refineries.

The public offer is expected to open on Monday, September 14, 2026, and close on October 13, 2026, subject to the final offer documents.

The offer comprises 4.1 billion ordinary shares at ₦525 per share, with a minimum subscription of 10 shares, costing ₦5,250.

Who Can Buy Dangote Refinery Shares?

The IPO is designed to give ordinary Nigerians an opportunity to invest in the refinery. Investors can subscribe through approved banks, fintech platforms, mobile operators, and NGX Invest.

However, investors should only use channels officially approved for the offer and should avoid sending money to individuals, agents, or platforms that are not listed in the official offer documents.

Approved Channels for the Dangote Refinery IPO
Banks
Access Bank
Ecobank
FCMB
Fidelity Bank
FirstBank
Globus Bank
GTCO
Jaiz Bank
Keystone Bank
Lotus Bank
PremiumTrust Bank
Providus Bank
Stanbic IBTC
Sterling Bank
TAJ Bank
UBA
Union Bank
Wema Bank
Zenith Bank
Fintech Platforms
Bamboo
Flutterwave
InvestNaija
Ladder
Moniepoint
Paga
Payaza
PiggyVest
Vetiva Invest
we.yan
Mobile Operators
Airtel SmartCash
MTN MoMo
Nigerian Exchange
NGX Invest

How to Buy Dangote Refinery IPO Shares

Step 1: Choose an Approved Platform

Select one of the banks, fintech platforms, mobile operators, or investment platforms officially approved to process subscriptions.

If you already use one of the approved platforms, check whether the IPO application option is available through your existing account.

Step 2: Open or Activate Your Investment Account

Investors generally need an investment or brokerage account to participate in the offer.

Depending on the platform, you may be required to provide identification, your BVN and other Know-Your-Customer information.

Step 3: Set Up Your CSCS Details

Shares listed on the Nigerian Exchange are held electronically through the Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS).

Your broker or participating investment platform should guide you through the process of opening or linking the necessary CSCS account.

Step 4: Fund Your Account

At ₦525 per share, the minimum subscription is:

10 shares × ₦525 = ₦5,250

If you want to purchase more shares, calculate the total amount based on the number of shares you intend to request and check the final prospectus for the applicable subscription rules and fees.

Step 5: Apply When the Offer Opens

The public offer is expected to open on September 14, 2026.

Log into your approved platform, select the Dangote Refinery public offer, enter the number of shares you want to subscribe for, review your information and submit your application.

Step 6: Keep Your Confirmation

After submitting your application, keep your application reference, receipt or confirmation for your records.

Step 7: Wait for Allotment

Applying for shares does not necessarily mean you will receive every share requested.

If the offer is oversubscribed, investors could receive fewer shares than they applied for. Any applicable excess funds should be handled according to the terms of the final offer documents.

Step 8: Monitor Your Shares After Listing

Once the shares are listed on the Nigerian Exchange, successful investors can monitor their holdings through their broker or investment platform.

The market price may rise or fall after listing, depending on the company’s performance, investor demand, market conditions and other factors.

Important Warning for Investors

Do not pay anyone personally to “secure” Dangote Refinery shares for you.

Before sending money or providing your financial information, verify that the platform you are using appears on the official approved list and that the application process matches the final prospectus and offer documents.

Investors should also review the official prospectus carefully, particularly the offer terms, fees, allotment rules, deadlines and risk factors.

Investment involves risk. The fact that an IPO is associated with a well-known company does not guarantee that the share price will rise after listing.

The first question was: Who created PFIPC? Now Nigeria must ask a more frightening one:Who allowed it to look real? That is the question the Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council scandal can no longer escape.

The controversy has already produced denials, accusations, official disclaimers, investigations and criminal proceedings. The Presidency has maintained that PFIPC was fictitious and that its alleged promoter, Prince Adeniyi Adeyemi Matthew, was falsely presenting himself as a government appointee. The Office of the Chief of Staff says it alerted security agencies as far back as October 2025 over alleged forged appointment letters.

Fine.Let the courts determine the criminal allegations.Let investigators establish who forged what, who authorised what and who benefited from what. But there is now another problem that cannot be dismissed as the work of one alleged impostor. The paper trail.

Because this story became truly explosive when reports emerged that the name PFIPC, alongside the Presidential Economic Advisory Council, appeared in the 2026 federal budget with an allocation of about ₦1.3 billion. Other reports also said the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation had approved recruitment for hundreds of positions linked to the council.

If those records are authentic, then Nigerians are entitled to ask a brutally simple question:

How does a supposedly non-existent organisation get into government paperwork? That question is bigger than Gbajabiamila. Much bigger.And it is precisely why this matter must not become a convenient contest between political camps.

The easiest thing to do now is to make this a story about whether the Chief of Staff was framed, whether he was wrongly accused, or whether his denials should be believed.

Those questions matter. But they are not enough. Because even if Gbajabiamila is completely cleared, the country will still be left staring at the same institutional wreckage.Somebody, somewhere, appears to have been able to give a questionable entity the appearance of government legitimacy.That is not a small administrative mistake.That is a security problem.

It is a governance problem. It is a financial-control problem.And, potentially, it is a national credibility problem. Think about the implications. An organisation carrying the word “Presidential” can sound powerful enough to impress businessmen, foreign investors, civil servants and even government officials.

A letter carrying the right government language can appear authentic.A title can sound official. An office address can create confidence. A meeting can create legitimacy.A photograph can create legitimacy. A budget line can create legitimacy.

And once enough of these pieces come together, fiction can begin to acquire the appearance of fact.That is the frightening part.The Nigerian state cannot afford to be protected by appearances. It must be protected by verification.

If PFIPC was indeed fabricated, then the sophistication of the alleged deception deserves serious attention. The Presidency itself said the alleged organisation had been presented as a government agency and that purported appointment letters carried falsified signatures, reference numbers and seals.That is not merely somebody printing a fake business card.That is an alleged attempt to manufacture the appearance of state authority. And the state must answer accordingly.

Who checked the documents? Who checked the appointment? Who checked the organisation's legal foundation? Who checked its place in the public service structure? Who checked its bank accounts?Who checked its office?Who checked its recruitment?Who checked its budgetary status?Who checked the officials supposedly running it?And, above all:Who had the power to stop it?Those are not partisan questions.They are state questions.

They belong to every Nigerian.This is why the PFIPC affair should now be treated as an institutional stress test. The result is uncomfortable.

The Nigerian government has demonstrated that it can publicly declare an organisation non-existent while questions simultaneously arise over how that same name appeared in official-looking government records.

Whatever the eventual explanation, that contradiction demands daylight.Not spin.Not political warfare.Not another round of accusations on television.Daylight.

If the budget entry was an administrative error, explain it.If it was inserted improperly, explain how.If recruitment approval was improperly obtained, explain who authorised it.If documents were forged, prosecute those responsible after due process.

If legitimate government officials were deceived, identify where the verification system failed.If insiders assisted the operation, expose them.And if no government insider was involved at all, then demonstrate clearly how outsiders were able to penetrate the machinery of government so deeply.

Nigeria deserves that answer.Because there is a dangerous habit in public life: once a scandal becomes embarrassing, the instinct is to find one person to carry it away.

Blame the impostor.Blame the politician.Blame the civil servant.Blame the opposition.Blame the media.Then move on.

That will not do this time.A country does not become safer because one alleged fraudster is prosecuted.It becomes safer when the system that made the fraud possible is repaired.That is the real test.

The PFIPC controversy has exposed a vulnerability that cannot be buried beneath another headline.

Government authority is an asset.It must be guarded.

The presidential name is an asset.It must be protected.Official documents are an asset.They must be secured.

The national budget is an asset.It must be beyond manipulation.And public confidence is perhaps the most valuable asset of all.

Once Nigerians begin to wonder whether an organisation can be invented, dressed in presidential language and somehow find its way into official channels, the damage extends beyond the immediate scandal.It reaches the credibility of the state.It reaches Nigeria's relationship with investors. It reaches the credibility of official correspondence.It reaches the confidence of foreign missions.It reaches the reputation of the civil service.And it reaches the fundamental question of whether government records mean what they say they mean.

That is why the authorities must resist the temptation to declare victory simply because an individual has been accused, investigated or prosecuted.

The deeper victory would be institutional.Find the loophole.Close it.Find the accomplices, if any.Expose them.Find the forged documents.Trace them. Find the money.Follow it. Find the approvals.Explain them.

Find the officials who failed in their duties.Hold them accountable, where evidence and due process establish responsibility.And then build a system in which the next PFIPC cannot happen.

Because there will always be fraudsters.There will always be con artists.There will always be people willing to manufacture influence. The real question is whether the Nigerian state makes their work easy.That is what Abuja must answer.

And this is where the story moves beyond Femi Gbajabiamila.If he is innocent of the allegations against him, then say so and let the evidence stand.But do not confuse the clearing of one man with the clearing of the system.One man can be innocent while a system is still guilty of negligence.That distinction matters.

Nigeria does not need another political scapegoat.It needs an audit of its gates.Who enters?Who leaves?Who signs?Who approves?Who verifies?Who pays?Who watches?And who answers when nobody watches?Those questions are now unavoidable.

The PFIPC scandal began as a dispute over an alleged organisation.It has become a test of something much larger:whether the Nigerian state can recognise itself when someone tries to impersonate it.That is not a scandal about one man.It is not even a scandal about one organisation.It is a warning about the machinery of government itself.And warnings ignored have a way of returning as disasters.

So let the investigation continue.Let the courts do their work.Let evidence—not political loyalty—determine responsibility.

But let nobody close this file merely because one powerful name has been cleared.The name may be cleared.The questions are not.
And until Nigerians know how an allegedly non-existent presidential body could acquire the appearance, paperwork and institutional oxygen of legitimacy, the PFIPC scandal remains unfinished. The mask may have been exposed. Now Nigeria must find out who opened the door.

Last week, this column began with a simple proposition: Nigeria’s public policy conversation is often conducted at the wrong altitude. We examined why citizens encounter the state most directly through schools, primary health centres, rural roads, markets, transport systems, environmental services and local government offices. We also argued that a policy problem must first be understood before it is solved. Today, the column continues that argument. If knowing the problem is the beginning, the next question is what happens when a carefully diagnosed problem enters the political and administrative machinery of government. This is where incentives, institutions, competing values and frontline discretion determine whether a promising policy becomes a public good or another abandoned initiative.

From Problems Towards Choices

A government rarely chooses between a good option and a bad option. It usually chooses among imperfect alternatives, each benefiting some citizens, imposing costs on others and carrying uncertainties.

That reality should make policy analysis more rigorous. William K. Bellinger’s work on economics for policy analysis provides a useful discipline: the relevant question is not simply whether government can afford an intervention, but whether its social benefits justify the resources sacrificed elsewhere. Every new road competes with a school. Every government factory competes with health spending. For state policymakers, the essential question is therefore: what else could this money achieve? A N10 billion expenditure should be evaluated against the outcomes forgone by not spending that money elsewhere. That is the difference between accounting for expenditure and analysing public value.

How Incentives Change Behaviour

This reasoning becomes sharper when we consider how citizens respond to government decisions. Lee S. Friedman’s microeconomic approach to policy reminds us that people respond to prices, rules, risks, information and incentives.

Consider local taxation. A local government that increases market levies may expect higher revenue. But if the burden becomes excessive, traders may relocate, evade payment or operate outside formal markets. The government may collect less while economic activity becomes harder to monitor. Similarly, multiple charges on farmers, transporters or small manufacturers can make formal activity less attractive.

The same logic applies to environmental regulation. If government prohibits indiscriminate dumping without providing affordable waste collection, households may continue dumping illegally because the lawful alternative is inaccessible. Enforcement alone cannot solve an incentive problem created partly by inadequate service provision. Good regulation combines rules with feasible alternatives. The objective should be to make desirable behaviour easier, not merely punish undesirable behaviour.

Why Politics Shapes Outcomes

But incentives alone do not explain policy outcomes. Deborah Stone’s work on policy paradox reminds us that public decisions are contests over values as much as calculations of efficiency. Nigerian policymakers operate where questions of distribution are inseparable from development. Who gets the road? Which community receives the hospital? Whose land is acquired? Which informal operators are displaced?

These are political questions with technical dimensions. A policy that is economically efficient may still fail if it is perceived as unfair. A reform that improves aggregate welfare may provoke resistance from groups bearing concentrated losses. Politically intelligent policy design must therefore anticipate winners, losers and the narratives through which both interpret reform.

Urban transportation illustrates the point. Formalising informal transport can improve safety and service standards, but simply removing existing operators can create hardship for drivers and passengers. Successful reform recognises the economic lives embedded in existing arrangements and provides credible transition pathways.

Institutions Carry Policy Forward

Michael Howlett, M. Ramesh and Anthony Perl of the Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy remind us that policy is not a single decision, but a process involving agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. A brilliant policy document can therefore become a poor programme because institutions lack coordination, information, authority or capacity.

Nigeria’s federal structure makes this especially difficult. Responsibilities are distributed across federal, state and local institutions, while financing and administrative capacity are uneven. A primary school may depend on one level for teachers, another for infrastructure and another for complementary interventions. A primary health centre may receive medicines through one channel, personnel through another and capital investment through a third. When outcomes are poor, each institution can point elsewhere.

The answer is not simply to redraw constitutional boundaries. For policymakers, this means resisting the temptation to treat political urgency as evidence. Urgency can justify action, but it cannot substitute for diagnosis, comparison, measurement and institutional realism and learning. It is to make responsibility visible. Citizens should know which institution is responsible for which service, what standard it must meet and where complaints should go.

Frontline Officials Make Policy

Perhaps nowhere is this more important than where policy meets the citizen. Research on street-level bureaucracy shows that frontline officials possess discretion because formal rules cannot anticipate every circumstance. Teachers decide how struggling pupils are treated. Nurses prioritise patients. Extension workers decide which farmers receive information. Environmental officers determine which violations receive attention.

Where incentives are weak and supervision poor, discretion can become rent extraction. But discretion can also enable adaptation. A teacher may develop a practical method for reaching struggling pupils. A health worker may reorganise patient flow to reduce waiting. A local official may find a simpler way to process applications. The challenge is therefore not to eliminate discretion, which is impossible, but to create conditions under which it serves public purposes.

States should pay closer attention to the working environment of frontline officials. If a policy assumes that an extension agent will visit remote farms without transport, or that a teacher will improve learning without materials, or that a health worker will provide reliable services without medicines, the policy is not ambitious. It is institutionally unrealistic.

Governments Must Learn Systematically

Nigeria has no shortage of programmes, strategies and reforms. What it lacks is a sufficiently systematic process for deciding which interventions deserve to survive. Governments often scale programmes because they are politically attractive, not because they have demonstrated results. Others abandon useful initiatives when administrations change. This produces institutional amnesia, with each government behaving as though it is starting from zero.

States should identify what they believe will happen, establish measurable indicators, test interventions, compare results and revise assumptions. Local governments should become sources of operational knowledge rather than administrative endpoints. Successful innovations should be documented and adapted before scaling. Failures should be examined rather than concealed.

A state may discover that feeder roads produce larger gains in farm incomes than subsidised inputs in one agricultural zone, while another finds that irrigation, storage or market aggregation is the binding constraint. The goal should be a common commitment to evidence, with flexibility for different solutions.

Good public policy requires more than money, political will or impressive documents. It requires an accurate understanding of reality, careful choices among alternatives, attention to incentives, sensitivity to political values, institutions capable of implementation and systems that learn from results. States and local governments are where these conditions either converge or collapse.

Next week, the conclusion of this three-part series will move from diagnosis to action. The final column will set out practical policy recommendations and ways forward for state and local government policymakers, focusing on education, primary healthcare, rural livelihoods, rural industrialisation, transportation, and ease of doing business among several others.

By Abdulrauf Aliyu